Abstract. In cryptographic access control sensitive data is protected by cryptographic primitives and the desired access structure is enforced through appropriate management of the secret keys. In this paper we study rigorous security definitions for the cryptographic enforcement of Role Based Access Control (RBAC). We propose the first simulationbased security definition within the framework of Universal Composability (UC). Our definition is natural and intuitively appealing, so we expect that our approach would carry over to other access models. Next, we establish two results that clarify the strength of our definition when compared with existing ones that use the game-based definitional approach. On the positive side, we demonstrate that both read and writeaccess guarantees in the sense of game-based security are implied by UC security of an access control system. Perhaps expected, this result serves as confirmation that the definition we propose is sound. Our main technical result is a proof that simulation-based security requires impractical assumptions on the encryption scheme that is employed. As in other simulation-based settings, the source of inefficiency is the well known "commitment problem" which naturally occurs in the context of cryptographic access control to file systems.
Introduction
Access control is one of the cornerstones of computer security. It comprises mechanisms and techniques that ensure that subjects (users, processes, etc) get access only to the objects (files, memory locations, etc) in a way that preserves the privacy/integrity of the objects per some access policy that is in place. Traditional access control mechanisms rely on reference monitors. Since monitors need to be permanently on-line and have to be executed in trust domains outside the control of the data owner(s), this has limitations that directly affect scalability and deployability of applications.
A solution to this problem employs cryptography and is based on a simple and elegant idea: protect the objects using cryptographic primitives (i.e. encryption to guarantee privacy and signatures for integrity) and then enforce the desired security policies by providing the right secret keys to the right parties. This type of implementation eliminates the need for an on-line monitor: the objects being protected can be made publicly available in encrypted form and access is only provided to the users that have the right secret keys.
Security models for cryptographic access control. Much of the prior work in this area was concerned with designing access control systems from basic cryptographic primitives [18, 15, 2, 11, 10, 9, 8] and/or designing new primitives tailored for the problem of access control [17, 23, 24, 14] . For the most part, the security of cryptographic access control systems was only heuristically studied. Yet, precise definitions are particularly important in this area: recent constructions employ complex cryptographic primitives for which the level of security is not always easy to ascertain and for which it is important to understand how they fit within the higher level systems that employ them. For instance, in attribute based encryption there is a sizable gap between security against adversaries that decide statically the keys they will attack and those that take this decision adaptively. Which of these types of schemes should be used in access control systems to ensure security requires rigorous definitions of what such systems aim to achieve and proofs that a given security level suffices.
Throughout the literature, rigorous models that look at the security of systems for access control have only sporadically been developed and were usually concerned with particular schemes or applications [19, 1, 7, 6] . Security models for broader frameworks have only recently been developed [13, 3] . One line of work in this direction is due to Ferrara et al. who consider cryptographic enforcement of Role-Based Access Control models [13, 12] . Specifically, they define a general syntax for cryptographic RBAC schemes (cRBAC in short), propose a security model that captures privacy guarantees for objects protected with such a system, and suggest an implementation based on predicate-encryption (PE).
The models proposed by Ferrara et al. use the so-called game-based approach. Here, the model formalizes the interaction between an adversary and the system and rigorously clarifies what is a security breach, e.g. as an event that occurs during the execution. The appeal of this approach is its relative simplicity: executions consider stand-alone scenarios where the system is in complete isolation from other systems and the different security goals (e.g. privacy and integrity of sensitive data) are treated independently from one another. At the same time, simplicity is also cause of some concern. Since the security games must specify precisely the information that an adversary can obtain when attacking the scheme, threats from arbitrary environments may not always be appropriately captured. Similarly, individual treatment of security properties may overlook unwanted interaction since oftentimes security properties are contradictory. Furthermore, it may not always be possible to exhaustively enumerate the different properties that one may desire from a system.
In this paper we consider a definitional alternative that does not suffer from the above shortcomings. Under this paradigm, called simulation-based approach, security is defined by comparing a system with an idealized version and demands that the real execution of a system reveals at most as much information is revealed by an ideal version of the system. As a consequence of this definition, the real system inherits all of the security properties of the ideal one, so there is no need to enumerate security properties separately. One important class of simulation-based security considers executions determined by an arbitrary environment (tasked, e.g. to provide inputs to the system), so security in this sense is composable in the sense that it is preserved in any environment in which the system is employed [4, 20, 22] . Unfortunately, simulation security is often difficult to establish and impose stringent restrictions on the implementations which rule out construction with no obvious weakness or, at the very least, require inefficient realizations [5, 25] . In particular, the only attempt at a simulation-based definition for access control is the work of Halevi, Karger, and Naor [19] who provide such a security notion for access control in distributed file storage. Their definition is for a specific system rather than for a general model as the one developed in this paper.
Our contribution. The observation that motivates this paper is that simulationbased security with composability properties is an excellent fit for the context of cryptographic access control. Such systems involve multiple parties, are quite complex and need to satisfy several security requirements (e.g. both individual and joint privacy for the protected objects). Moreover, by their raison d'être, access control systems need to maintain their security properties when employed within higher level protocols. Below, we overview our results.
Security definition. We start with the formalization of an ideal functionality that captures the security guarantees expected from a cryptographic RBAC system. Our functionality reflects directly the semantics associated to RBAC systems [26] . Roughly speaking, the functionality keeps track of all of the operations performed on the system and maintains the induced access control matrix; user requests to access files are then granted/refused based on this matrix. Security in the sense that we define requires that an adversary cannot do more against the concrete implementation than it can do against the functionality. This requirement essentially says that the implementation enforces the expected semantics of the RBAC system. Technically, to show security one needs to construct a simulator which can simulate the complete view that an adversary has against the real system but only from access to the information that the ideal functionality provides.
We note that our approach should work for any other model that benefits from a precise semantics with an induced access control matrix.
Relation with game-based definitions. Next, we study the relation between the existent game-based security notions and the level of security that our definition entails. It is generally believed that, for the same task, simulation-based security is stronger than game-based security, even if only because the former is supposed to capture all of the security properties expected of a system. Indeed, we show that our notion of security entails both security with respect to read access (the game-based variant introduced in [13] ) and write access (the game-based variant introduced in [12] ). While expected these types of results help build confidence in the definitions.
Lower-bounds for UC-secure cRBAC. Our main result is a gap between simulationsecurity and game-based security. More precisely, we show that it is impossible for a cryptographic RBAC system to be UC-secure. In technical terms, we show that the so-called commitment problem [5] occurs in the context of access control. Roughly, the problem is that the simulator required by the security definition needs to produce valid looking encryptions of the objects that are protected without actually knowing the actual content of these objects (e.g. files). The problem is that when the adversary gains access to such a file (e.g. by corrupting a user who has access to this file), the simulator needs to produce a decryption key that explains the ciphertext as an encryption of some particular content which the simulator did not know when the ciphertext was created.
In a bit more detail, our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we provide a generic construction of a universally composable non-interactive communication protocol (NICP) out of any universally composable cRBAC system. A classical result by Nielsen shows that such schemes do not exist if no setup assumptions are in place [25] . Nielsen's result does not apply directly in our setting since our construction of a NICP inherits several assumptions that are in place for the cR-BAC system; in particular, it requires a publicly available file-system and secure channels between some of the parties. We bypass this difficulty by extending Nielsen's impossibility result to settings that involve these setup assumptions whenever their use are restricted in certain ways, and argue that these restrictions are natural in access control.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief overview of Canetti's UC framework [4] , provide some background of the Role-Based Access Control and recall Ferrara et at.'s notion of cryptographic Role-Based Access Control.
The Universal Composability (UC) framework. The UC framework is based on the "real-world/ideal-world " paradigm, which originates in Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson's paper [16] . The basic idea of this paradigm is to show that the execution of a real-world protocol emulates a process which carries out the given task in an idealized way: all the participants securely provide their individual inputs to a trusted party, who then locally computes the outputs and provide them to the participants according to the specification of the task. The emulation property essentially requires that every possible damage caused by an adversary against the real system can also be simulated by an adversary (the simulator) in the ideal world. Since an adversary cannot really break the idealized protocol, the real-world protocol should also be secure.
This paradigm has been further developed by the UC framework. In the UC framework, the trusted party of the ideal process is modelled as an entity called ideal functionality and denoted by F. In addition to handling the inputs obtained repeatedly from the parties and generating the prescribed outputs, F is allowed to interact with the adversary, in a way that captures the allowed leakage of the protocol. To provide security guarantee under composition, the UC framework introduces an adversarial entity called the environment Z, which represents all possible settings in which the protocol can be executed. Z acts as an interactive distinguisher which aims to tell if it is interacting with the real protocol or with the ideal one. In the process, the environment is allowed to exchange information with the adversary, to provide inputs to the participants of it choice and to obtain outputs from them. A protocol Π is said to securely realize the functionality F, if for any adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that no environment can distinguish between its interactions with parties running Π and A and the interactions with the ideal process for F and S.
An special type of adversary is the so-called dummy adversary D. This adversary simply delivers the messages from the environment to the parties and forwards the messages from the parties to the environment: this adversary essentially allows the environment to fully control the input/output and the communication between the parties. A simulator that works for the dummy adversary essentially gives rise to a simulator for any other adversary.
An important concept in the UC framework is the hybrid model, an execution setting which is a mix between a real protocol and an idealized setting. Specifically, in an F-hybrid the parties running the protocol can use multiple copies of an ideal functionality F. The extension of the notion of realizing of an ideal functionality in the hybrid model is immediate. In fact, it captures the essence of the general composition theorem specific to UC. If a protocol ρ securely realizes an ideal functionality G in F-hybrid model and there is a protocol π securely realizes F, then the composed protocol ρ π/F where all the calls to F are replaced by calls to π securely realizes G. Hence π provides the same security guarantee as the ideal functionality F even if used within an arbitrary protocol ρ; furthermore the composed protocol ρ π/F still provides the same security guarantee as the ideal functionality G.
One particular application of hybrid models is to capture various communication models. This is achieved by formulating an appropriate ideal functionality F that represents the abstraction from the communication, then real-world protocols in the communication model can be presented in the F-hybrid model. To exemplify this approach, we present F smt , the ideal functionality for secure message transmission (aka secure communication) in Fig. 1 . In F smt , a sender P S with input m sends its input to a receiver P R , while the adversary only learns |m|, the length of the message m, and can delay the message delivery. Notice that F smt can only transmit a single message, to transmit multiple messages we need to use multiple instances of F smt . We refer to [4] for more details and formal descriptions about the UC framework.
Cryptographic Role-Based Access Control. Role-based access control (RBAC) is a general access control model that offers many benefits including allowing for fine-grained access controls and simplifying the management of user permissions. Instead of assigning users with the permissions directly, it introduces an indirection namely the roles such that the access control policies are decomposed into two associations: the user-role assignment relation and permission-role assignment relation. More formally, at any point a (core) RBAC Functionality Fsmt Fsmt proceeds as follows, with a sender PS, a receiver PR and an adversary S.
1. Upon receiving an input (Send, sid, PR, m) from PS, send (Sent, sid, PS, PR, |m|)
to the adversary and generate a delayed output (Sent, PS, sid, m) to PR then halt. 2. Upon receiving (Corrupt, sid, P ) from S, where P ∈ {PS, PR}, reveal m to the adversary. If P = PS and the message has not yet been sent to PR, then ask S for a value m and output (Sent, PS, sid, m ) to PR then halt. system is in a state which consists of a set of users U , a set of roles R, a set of permissions P , a relation UA ⊆ U × R which records the assignment of users to roles and a relation PA ⊆ P × R which maintains the assignment of permissions to roles. Intuitively, a user u has the permission p if there exists a role r such that (u, r) ∈ UA and (p, r) ∈ PA.
The state of an RBAC system changes dynamically. Throughout the paper we make the simplifying assumption that the set of roles R is fixed (the assumption reflects the reality that in many organizations the role structure is usually stable). The remaining components of the state change following administrative commands of the form (U , O , P , UA , PA ) ← Cmd ((U, O, P, UA, PA), arg). We summarize the typical commands and their intended semantics in Fig. 2 .
U ∪ {u} Add a new user u to the system
UA ∪ {(u, r)} Assign the user u to the role r DeassignUser(u, r) UA \ {(u, r)} Deassign the user u from the role r GrantPerm(p, r)
PA ∪ {(p, r)} Grant the permission p to the role r RevokePerm(p, r)
PA \ {(p, r)} Revoke the permission p from the role r At a high-level, a cryptographic implementation of RBAC (cRBAC) consists of algorithms that implement the administrative commands outlined above, in a way that enforces the desired access matrix of the system. Formal syntax and security for such systems have been introduced by Ferrara et al. for the case where access is only concerned with reading sensitive data [13] and was later extended to also enforcing writing to sensitive files [12] . As in these works, we assume a setting that involves three main entities: a manager, a file system and a set of users. The manager is assumed to be a trusted party and is tasked with carrying out the administrative commands. The file system is publicly-accessible and is assumed to support versioning -users are only allowed to append content to the file system but not to delete any data.
More precisely, a cRBAC scheme CRBAC consists of the following algorithms: Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm, Update, Write and Read. As suggested above (and by their names) most of the algorithms correspond to the different administrative commands of RBAC. There are three additional algorithms which we describe below. We assume that they define non-interactive multi-party computations which proceeds as follows: first, the manager carries out some local computations according to the RBAC command (including updates to the file system) and produces a set of update messages, one for each of the users. The messages are sent over private channels to users who use it to update their local state. Therefore, these algorithms take as input the locate state of the manager st M , the current state of the file system fs and the argument for the command arg as input and output an updated state fs for file system accordingly, a new state for the manager and a set of update messages {msg u } u∈U for the users. When a user u receives an update message msg u from the manager, it then executes the Update algorithm with its local state st[u] and the message to update its local state accordingly. The Read and Write are the algorithms that allow users to read/write from the files. Both algorithms take as input the local state of the user st[u], a file name o (potentially some content to be written to the file m) and the state of the file system fs. The Read algorithm should return the content of the file; the Write algorithm should return the content that should be appended to the file system.
A UC security definition for cRBAC
This section presents a universally composable security definition for cRBAC systems. We formalize the security requirements by designing an ideal functionality F crbac .
Functionality F crbac . The ideal functionality we present in Fig. 3 captures the intuitive security properties of cRBAC systems in the way of simply behaving as a server-mediated access control on the files being protected. Very roughly, F crbac keeps track of every operation performed on the system and maintain the induced access control matrix within, while it preserves that only the authorized access requests will be granted. This is achieved by having F crbac maintain a built-in database to store the content of every file, along with a symbolic RBAC state of the system. Then it handles every access request according to the RBAC state.
More specifically, F crbac embodies the essential interfaces of a cRBAC system, including system initialization, RBAC administration and read/write access to the file system. It proceeds as follows. Having received an initialization request Functionality Fcrbac Fcrbac proceeds as follow, with a manager M , users u1, ..., un and an adversary S.
Initialization: Upon receiving an input (Initialization, sid, R) from M where R is a set of roles, send (Initialization, sid, R) to S, initialize an object-indexed list FS ← ∅ and the symbolic RBAC state (U, O, P, R, PA, UA) ← (∅, ∅, ∅, R, ∅, ∅).
After that, mark the system as initialized and ignore all the inputs of the form (Initialization, sid, R ) for some R from now on. RBAC administration: Upon receiving an input (RBAC, sid, cmd , arg) from M where cmd is one of the administrative RBAC commands specified in Fig. 2 and arg is the command-specific arguments, proceed as follows: If the system has not yet been initialized, or the execution of cmd with arg is invalid (e.g. it is considered as invalid if cmd ="GrantPerm" and arg = (p, r), where r / ∈ R), return an error. Otherwise, update the current RBAC state symbolically (U , O , P , UA , PA ) ← cmd ((U, O, P, UA, PA), arg) and then send (RBAC, with a set of roles R from the manager M , F crbac initializes an object-indexed list fs and the symbolic system RBAC state. Then it notices the adversary that the access control system is initialized with a set of roles R. Once F crbac is initialized, it ignores the other initialization request afterwards. Having received a request of executing an administrative RBAC command from M , F crbac checks if the command and its arguments specified in the request are valid. If so, it executes the command symbolically and updates the system RBAC state. The administrative RBAC command can be either of the commands presented in database, F crbac guarantees correctness: the content that has been written to a file by an authorized user will be read by a user who is entitled to read that file. F crbac is a standard corruption ideal functionality, with an exception that the manager M cannot be corrupted. It captures the reasonable trust on the manager to administrate the access control system. Several remarks on F crbac are in order. First, F crbac is an ideal functionality for the general cryptographic role-based access controls. Due to the purpose of studying the relation between the previous game-based security notions, F crbac does not handle any administrative request of adding a new role or removing an existing role. Second, F crbac only guarantees secure access to the file system and preserves no policy privacy (when handling an administrative request, it simply reveals the command and the arguments to the adversary). There still exists some design choices on policy privacy preserving (e.g. only leaks the executed command but not its arguments), which is left as further study. Third, F crbac makes no explicit restriction on the form of the file system and the file system is not designed as an individual party of the system. Thus in a real-world cRBAC system, the file system should be implemented by the protocol itself. It also captures that the file system does not implement any access control mechanism. Fourth, F crbac does not have any authentication mechanism on the parties' identities. The authentication is left to the protocols that make calls to F crbac .
Before presenting our definition of universally composable cRBAC system, we first need to transform a cRBAC scheme CRBAC = (Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm) into an associated protocol Π CRBAC in the UC setting accordingly. Recall that CRBAC assumes private channels between the manager and the users. To model this, we let the parties have access to F smt , the ideal functionality of secure message transmission which is presented in Fig. 1 . Also, CRBAC makes use of a publicaccessible versioning file system. This is modelled by an appropriate functionality F vfs which is presented in Fig. 4 . F vfs proceeds with a set of users and a data manager. Essentially, it serves as an ideal versioning file system which guarantees the correct ordering of the file versions. The users can "write" to the file system by appending new versions to the files instead of overwriting existing contents. The data manager is provided with richer interfaces: it can remove and even rewrite some existing version of a file. All the users in the system can check the current state of the file system by providing a status request to F vfs . In implementation, the state of the file system would be a bitstring which consists of an array of (possibly encrypted) files; while in F vfs , it is presented as a list of entries with no loss of generality. When any change happens to the file system, the ideal functionality reveals the change to the adversary and also notices the users about the change. These reflect the public-accessible feature of the file system. In addition, any write operation to the file system is done in an anonymous manner, F vfs will not reveal information about the identity of the party who carries out the write operation.
To simplify the protocol presentation, we will also define some shorthand notations. When a party runs some algorithm, it may generate a set of orderpreserving instructions to be carried out on the file system. We use {info i } i∈N to denote this set of instructions. If the party is the manager, each instruction info i ∈ {info i } i∈N can be either (Write, sid, o, ver, c) or (Remove, sid, o, ver), where sid is the session id of F vfs . If the party is a user, it can only be the form (Write, sid, o, c). A party may also need to come up with a set of order-preserving instructions {info fs→fs i } i∈N such that after carrying out the instructions on the file system in order, the current state of the file system fs would become fs . We say a party sends {info i } i∈N (or {info fs→fs i } i∈N ) to F vfs , it means the party provides every instruction info i of the set as the input to F vfs in order.
We now present the associated protocol Π CRBAC (in Fig. 5 ) and define universally composable cRBAC system. Definition 1. Let CRBAC = (Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm) be a cRBAC scheme, we say CRBAC is UC-secure if the associated protocol Π CRBAC securely realizes F crbac in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model and in a setting that the manager never gets corrupted.
The Protocol ΠCRBAC
The participants: a manger M and a set of users u1, ..., un.
Initialization: Upon receiving an input (Initialization, sid, R) where R is a set of roles, M computes (stM , fs, {msg u }u∈U ) ←$ Init(1 λ , R). It then invokes an instance of Fvfs as the data manager with session id (M, sid), parses fs as {info i } i∈N and sends {info i } i∈N to Fvfs. If {msg u }u∈U is non-empty, M sends msg u to every user u using Fsmt. Administration: Upon receiving an input (RBAC, sid, cmd , arg) where cmd can be either of the administrative commands specified in Fig. 2 and arg is the arguments of the command, M sends (Status, (M, sid)) to Fvfs to obtain (Content, sid, fs) and then computes (st M , fs , {msg u }u∈U ) ←$ Cmd (stM , fs, arg), where Cmd is the algorithm that implements the administrative command cmd . M sets stM ← st M , and then comes up with {info
} i∈N is non-empty, M sends {info fs→fs i } i∈N to Fvfs. If {msg u }u∈U is non-empty, M sends msg u to every user u using Fsmt. Update: Upon receiving a message (Update, sid, msg u ) from M , a user u computes st u ←$ Update(stu, msg u ), where stu is u's local state (stu is an empty value when u receives the first update message from M ). Then it sets stu ← st u . Write: Upon receiving an input (Write, sid, o, m), a user u sends (Status, (M, sid))
to Fvfs to get (Content, sid, fs) and computes fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o, m). Then u comes up with {info fs→fs i } i∈N and sends it to Fvfs. Read: Upon receiving an input (Read, sid, o), a user u sends (Status, (M, sid)) to Fvfs to get (Content, sid, fs) and then outputs (Read, sid, Read(stu, fs, o)). Proof sketch. We show that if CRBAC is not secure with respect to write accesses, then it cannot be UC-secure. Given an adversary A W that breaks write security of CRBAC, an environment Z can distinguish its interactions with parties running Π CRBAC and a dummy adversary, and the interactions with the ideal process for F crbac and a simulator. The idea is, Z runs a local copy of A W and simulates to it the experiment that defines write security of cRBAC schemes. Then Z proceeds according A W 's queries such that the protocol execution is consistent to A W 's view. Since A W is a successful adversary by assumption, Z should be able to write some valid content without having the permission in the real-world execution with non-negligible probability. But in the ideal world, from the specification of F crbac we can infer that Z will not be able to write any content to the file system in this case. The full proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Any cRBAC scheme CRBAC which is UC-secure (in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model) is secure with respect to read accesses.
Proof sketch. The proof idea of this theorem is analogous to Theorem 1's. Given an adversary A R that breaks read security of CRBAC, an environment Z can tell its interactions with the execution of Π CRBAC and a dummy adversary from the interactions with the ideal process for F crbac and a simulator. Similarly, Z runs a local copy of A R and simulates to it the experiment that defines read security. Then Z transforms every query from A R , which will not lead to a trivial win, into appropriate inputs being provided to the parties and the adversary. By the assumption on A R , Z would be able to distinguish its interactions in the two worlds with the help of A R . The full proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix C.
5 Impossibility of UC-secure cRBAC scheme
In this section we establish our main result. We show that the level of security demanded by a universally composable cryptographic RBAC system cannot be achieved, even in a setting where a protocol has access to an idealized file system and secure channels between all parties. Our impossibility result is in a setting where the adversary can adaptively corrupt honest protocol participants.
Functionality Fnce
Fnce works as follows. It interacts with a message sender PS, a receiver PR and an adversary S.
Pre-processing phase: Upon receiving an input (Init, sid, PR) from PS, send (Init, sid, PS) to PR and send (Init, sid, PS, PR) to S. In addition, mark the channel as established. Communication phase: Upon receiving an input (Send, sid, PR, m) from PS, if the channel has not been established, ignore this input. Otherwise, deliver the message (Send, sid, PS, m) to PR and reveal (Sent, sid, PS, PR, |m|) to S, where |m| is the length of the message. Corruption: Upon receiving (Corrupt, sid, P ) from S where P ∈ {PS, PR}, reveal m to S. If P = PS and the message has not yet been delivered to PR, ask S for a value m then output (Sent, sid, PS, m ) to PR. Theorem 3. There exists no UC-secure cRBAC scheme (in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model) with adaptive corruptions.
Proof: The proof of this theorem proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the existence of any UC-secure cRBAC scheme implies the existence of a universally composable NICP. Specifically, we provide a generic construction of a NICP that securely realizes the functionality F nce of non-committing encryption (which is presented in Fig. 6 ), from any UC-secure cRBAC scheme. Next, we argue that the resulting communication protocol in fact cannot securely realize F nce -this step is an extension of a well known result by Nielsen to a setting where parties have access to a secure file system and secure channels.
The Protocol Πnicp
The participants: a message sender PS, a receiver PR and a trusted party M namely the manager.
Pre-processing phase. M establishes the communication channel for PS and PR.
In this stage, some content might be written to Fvfs for the channel set-up.
1. Upon receiving an input (Init, sid, PR), PS sends (Init, sid, PR) to M using Fsmt. 2. Upon receiving a message (Init, sid, PR) from PS, M selects a random role r and computes (stM , fs,
, where uS and uR are two users to be added to the system. It initializes two lists msg S ← st [uS] and msg R ← st [uR] . M then invokes an instance of Fvfs with session id (M, sid) as the data manager and parses fs as {info i } i∈N . If {info i } i∈N is non-empty, M sends {info i } i∈N to Fvfs. After that, M runs a sequence of algorithms which implement the related administrative RBAC commands to add two users uS, uR and an object o to the system, to grant the write permission of o to uS via the role r and to grant the read permission of o to uR via r. The run of any of the algorithms might lead to the file system's current state fs gets updated to fs . If so, M comes up with {info fs→fs i } i∈N and sends it to Fvfs. Whenever an update message msg for uS (uR resp.) is generated, M appends it to the list msg S (msg S resp.). Finally, after the run of the algorithms M sends (Update, sid, msg S ) to PS and sends (Update, sid, msg R ) to PR using Fsmt. 3. Upon receiving a message (Update, sid, msg X ) from M where X ∈ {S, R}, the party PX updates its local state by running the update algorithm stX ←$ Update(stX , msg) on each update message msg ∈ msg X in order.
Communication Phase. Once the channel has been established, PS can send arbitrarily many messages to PR via Fvfs. We start by describing the generic construction for the universally composable NICP. Recall that based on our transformation, the associated protocol of a cRBAC scheme works in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model and in a setting that the manager never gets corrupted, the resulting communication protocol therefore works in the same hybrid model and makes use of such a trusted party in a restricted way.
The communication protocol involves a message sender, a receiver and a trusted party namely the manager. We restrict that there exists no direct communication channel between the sender and the receiver. They have to communicate with each other in an indirect way: after a pre-processing phase in which the manager interacts with the other two parties over secure channels to establish the communication, the sender can send messages to the receiver by writing to the file system and then the receiver performs read operations to get the messages. Notice that the read operation will not bring any change to the file system and the manager only works in the pre-processing phase and does not involve in the communication phase. The communication protocol in fact requires no interaction between the sender and the receiver. Hence it can be considered as non-interactive.
More specifically, let CRBAC = {Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm, Update, Write, Read} be a UC-secure cRBAC scheme. We denote the NICP by Π nicp and present it Fig. 7 .
Then we show that Π nicp securely realizes F nce in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model. By assumption, the scheme CRBAC is UC-secure implies that there exists a simulator S such that no environment can tell with non-negligible probability whether it interacts with the parties running Π CRBAC in (F smt , F vfs )-hybrid model and a dummy adversary D, or it interacts with the ideal process for F crbac with S. Then we give the construction of the simulator S nce for Π nicp as follows. S nce internally runs an instance of S. Then it interacts with S as the environment and simulates to S the ideal process for F crbac . It proceeds as follow.
1. Simulating the pre-processing phase. Upon receiving from F nce a message (Init, sid, P S , P R ), S nce selects a random role r. It then simulates the pre-processing phase by sending messages to S sequentially in the name of F crbac indicating that the cRBAC system is initialized with a role r, two users u S and u R , an object o are added to the system, u S is granted the write permission of o via the role r and u R is granted the read permission of o via r. When the environment requests S nce to provide any information that it can obtain during this phase including the length of any final update message sent by the manager in Π nicp and any content written to F vfs , S nce instructs S to provide the related information and hands it to the environment appropriately. 2. Simulating the communication phase. Upon receiving from F nce a message (Sent, sid, P S , P R , |m|), S nce sends (Wrote, sid , o, |m|) in the name of F crbac to S, where sid = (M, sid). When the environment requests S nce to report the content written to F vfs , S nce instructs S to report such content and forwards it as its output appropriately. 3. Party corruption. When the environment instructs S nce to corrupt P S (P R resp.), S nce delivers the corruption message to F nce and also requests S to corrupt u S (u R resp.). If the corruption happens after P S has ever sent some message to P R , S nce will also obtain the messages sent so far from F nce .
Then it provides the obtained information to S in the name of F crbac . Once S outputs the internal state of the corrupt party, S nce forwards it to the environment. After that, any message provided by the environment to the corrupt party would be modified as the message for u S (u R resp.) accordingly and forwarded to S (e.g. if the environment instructs the corrupt sender to send some message c, S nce then instructs S to write the message c to the file o on behave of u S ). Any request from the environment to corrupt the manager will be ignored.
We briefly analyse the validity of S nce . Suppose there exists an environment Z which can tell its interactions with parties running Π nicp in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model and a dummy adversary from the interactions with the ideal process for F nce and S nce with non-negligible probability. We show that an environment Z can be constructed to tell whether it is interacting with parties running Π CRBAC in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model and a dummy adversary or the interactions with the ideal process for F crbac and the simulator S with non-negligible probability. The main idea is that Z runs an internal copy of Z towards which it simulates the view of the ideal process for F nce and the simulator S nce . The simulation depends the information that Z can obtain during the protocol execution. From the construction of S nce above, it can be inferred that every instruction for S nce can be broken down to corresponding instructions to S. Also, for the inputs that Z provides to the dummy parties in the ideal process for F nce , Z can modify them appropriately and provide to the parties it interacts with. Hence we havethe simulation Z provides to Z is perfectly identical to the view which Z expects to see. Then by assumption, Z can tell its interactions in the two worlds with non-negligible probability, and so can Z in this case. Thus, S cannot be a valid simulator for Π CRBAC which reaches a contradiction. So if S is a valid simulator for Π CRBAC , S nce is also a valid simulator for Π nicp and therefore Π nicp securely realizes F nce in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model. Now we argue that in fact such a simulator S does not exist. In [25] , it has been shown that no non-interactive communication protocol that securely realizes F nce exists in the plain model. However, we cannot apply directly that result to complete our proof, since Π nicp makes use of F vfs , F smt , albeit in a restricted way. Nonetheless, we show that under these usage restrictions, we can extend Nielsen's result to our setting.
Since Π nicp securely realizes F nce in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model, it allows the sender to send arbitrarily many messages to the receiver non-interactively (e.g. by performing write operations to the file system). Any real-world adversary that attacks the protocol cannot obtain more than the length of the transmitted message. Consider the following environment Z. After the communication is established between the message sender P S and the receiver P R , Z activates P S with an input (Send, sid, m) and requests the adversary to report the content c that has been written to some file o of F vfs . Once Z obtains c, it instructs the adversary to corrupt P R to obtain its internal state st R . Then Z produces the current state of the file system from the update information provided by the adversary as fs and computes m ← Read(st R , fs, o). By assumption Z should have m = m except for negligible probability. Then we consider the ideal-world case, the simulator S nce should be able to come up with c given the length of m by F nce , and later it should be able to provide the internal state st R which is consistent to the transmitted message c when m is available by the time P R is corrupt. Notice that the ideal functionality F nce guarantees correctness on the transmitted message, which means for every message sent by the sender, the receiver should be able to recover the original message except for negligible probability. Hence for Π nicp , there should not exist any local state of the receiver that allows it to decrypt any written content to the file system into two different messages with non-negligible probability each. Otherwise an environment can distinguish its interactions in the two worlds with non-negligible probability. Thus if we fix a file version c, there exists an injective mapping from the underlying messages to the local state of the receiver, which implies that the number of possible internal states st R of P R should be at least the same as the number of the possible messages. Notice that the only way P R can receive the message from P S is to execute the Read algorithm to retrieve the current content of o from the file system. The injective mapping will not be affected by executing read operations since (by assumption) Read updates neither the file system nor the local state of P S . Therefore it is impossible for P R to use the unchanged local state to receiver arbitrary many messages from P S . Thus we can conclude that Π nicp does not securely realize F nce in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model, which contradicts the existence of the simulator S. Hence there exists no UC-secure CRBAC (in (F vfs , F smt )-hybrid model) with adaptive corruptions.
Conclusion
We present a security definition for cryptographic role-based access control in the UC framework. We study its relation with existent game-based notions and show that simulation-based security is strictly stronger. In essence, our results imply that composable simulation-based security for access control may be difficult to achieve to the point that it is impractical 1 Interestingly, similar results were derived empirically in a recent study of the efficiency of cryptographic RBAC based on both standard asymmetric encryption and identity-based encryption schemes [21] .
In future work, we plan to study the efficiency implications of UC security for cryptographic access control schemes that hide the access policy that is in place at any given time during the execution of the system.
